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Abstract 
 This study tests the hypothesis that the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool produces 
favorable conditions for an increase in terrorism activity using cases of sanctions against Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Libya, and Iran. Using literature as the basis for this hypothesis, data suggests that 
there is not significant evidence to support this theory using these cases. The circumstances 
surrounding the political environment and stability of each country tells different stories, where 
attributing rising terrorist activity to sanctions themselves ignores the complexity of foreign 
economies their political and social atmospheres in which they operate. This thesis alludes to 
several questions and opportunities for further study on the circumstances in which sanctions are 
applied that may correlate with rising terrorism. 
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Literature Review: 
A. Terrorism 
Conditions that fuel the dynamics of terrorist activity involve complex interactions 
between several actors, where much of the literature on the onset of terrorism has focused on 
case studies to explain why individuals turn to violence. Cross-sectional studies outline overall 
patterns of key variables, suggesting that political violence manifests in the midst of instability 
from several situations. Ultimately, collective ideological violence is a social phenomenon 
illustrated by statistical and qualitative literature. For the purpose of this study, terrorism is 
defined as the “threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain 
a political, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation,” taken from the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 
Challenging the widely-held belief that terrorism is rooted in poor socio-economic 
conditions (Bush, 2002; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003), Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) 
analyzed cases of severe inequality, concluding they pose a higher risk of having terrorist 
activity compared to overall poverty measurements. Others test for the roots of terrorism by 
analyzing other variables in isolation, failing to find significant evidence that poverty alone 
provides conditions for increased violence (Abadie, 2006). Gurr’s (1970) original theory of 
relative deprivation compiles circumstances in which individuals are more likely to resort to 
violence in response to grievances. The ratio of perceived entitlement to opportunity compared to 
what individuals’ actual capabilities creates “relative deprivation,” leading to frustration and 
aggression, over time creating motives for political violence. Enders and Hoover see no direct 
correlation between per capita GDP and terrorism, but instead find a negative relationship 
between political and democratic freedom and terrorism levels, in which case countries with high 
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levels of income inequality tend to have higher levels of terrorist cases (2012). More importantly, 
lack of economic opportunity becomes a large factor in the decision to join a terrorist 
organization, along with lack of social and political power (Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011; 
Petersen, 2002). Certain groups benefit from political and economic instability and general 
economic grievances by taking advantage of the “losers” in such cases, creating an atmosphere 
of support for opposition groups for local communities (Mclean et al., 2018). Inequality in 
isolation does not guarantee violent responses, but generates conditions that mobilizes group 
grievances, emotions, frustrations over “unmet expectations” and a “narrative” that collectively 
triggers violence (World Bank United Nations, 2018, p. 109). Leaders additionally have the 
ability to frame inequality from sanctions by blaming another party (World Bank United Nations, 
2018), further shaping ideology that escalates emotional responses. 
Political violence research demonstrates how terrorism seeks to exploit the human flaw of 
emotion from state actors to react out of anger instead of using rational strategy (McConaghy, 
2017). Sociologist theories elaborate on the types of emotions following loss of power and status, 
seeing that negative outlooks and blaming others for sudden loss of prestige incites violence 
(Kemper, 1978; Turner & Stets, 2005). McConaghy simplifies foreign policy decisions at state 
level, regarding the state as not functioning as a unitary actor but a collection of people with 
“competing and mutually clashing interests,” where individuals find themselves subject to 
emotional responses (p. 106). Having similar views, English (2010) sees terrorism as “too 
tempting a form of warfare” to dissolve, because emotions throw off the rationality in responsive 
thought processes. Ezrow (2017) demonstrations how terrorist organizations therefore use 
psychological tools to mobilize sympathizers and supporters, adding that globalization increases 
the scope and longevity of non-state actors, making internal issues externalized and vice-versa 
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and changing the scope of perceived inequality (p. 56). Additional research concludes a pattern 
of key variables likely to create conditions that favor an increase in terrorist activity: 
unemployment, repressive politics, lack of service from the state, lack of income to invest in 
defense, and unequal dispersion of goods (Patrick, 2010; Piazza, 2008; Von Hippel, 2002).  
Theoretically, these are all potential results from economic sanctions in target states. 
B. Economic Sanctions 
Often used as alternative policy to force and doing nothing, economic sanctions are a tool 
for coercing governments into changing their behavior by cutting off their resources (Baldwin, 
1999; Hufbauer et al., 2009; Leksian & Souva, 2013). Taking the form of trade, asset, and 
financial sanctions, the diplomatic goals of these economic policies vary from moderate to high, 
reflected by the amount of damage inflicted, and the effectiveness of sanctioning efforts vary 
depending on the analysis criteria (Hufbauer et al., 2009). In the past, traditional sanctions as a 
coercion tool were perceived by the international community as morally preferable to military 
force; however, literature suggests that sanctions bring about broad suffering and humanitarian 
crises in targeted countries, unintentionally inflicting pain and physical harm on the population 
(Pierce, 1996). Seeing that comprehensive sanctions abruptly disturb large ranges of people, the 
“collateral damage” seen in many cases has shifted the support toward more targeted policies 
(Cortright & Lopez, 2002). Compared to the just war theory, sanctions tend to affect 
noncombatants just as unethical war practices have, and the focus on targeted sanctions have not 
proven to be an entirely ethical alternative, either (Early & Schulzke, 2018). According to 
research by Early and Schulzke (2018), targeted sanctions not only pose a moral hazard by 
misleading policymakers into false claims of morality, but they also are ineffective when the 
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consequences are low. Therefore, in terms of achieving efficacy, policymakers often blur the line 
between broad-scope sanctions and targeted sanctions. 
As the standard for measuring economic sanctions’ success has evolved over time, 
effectiveness measures include analysis at different stages of implementation, including the 
threat stage (Drezner, 2003), as well as broader inclusion of these policies’ goals (Biersteker et 
al., 2016; Whang, 2011). Most of the literature explains why sanctions are ineffective on their 
own, and how the costs often outweigh the benefits when considering collateral damage and 
negative unintended consequences (Andreas, 2005; Early, 2016; Feaver & Lorber, 2015; Peksen, 
2009). Others detail how sanctions are effective in coercing target states when used with other 
tools or are cooperated with heavily by the international community (Biersteker et al., 2016; 
Cortright & Lopez, 2005; Hufbauer et al., 2007). The most concrete success rate of sanctions 
cases is about 33% according to Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Hufbauer et al.), suggesting 
the need for either reevaluation of “effectiveness” or policy reform. 
Seen in the light of “economic warfare,” it is additionally argued that sanctions pose just 
as much of a danger to human life and well-being as weapons of mass destruction (Habibzadeh, 
2018; Mueller & Mueller, 1999). A popular example is the comprehensive sanctions regime 
against Hussein’s Iraq, where five hundred thousand children’s deaths were reported (Gordon, 
2010). Peksen and Drury (2010) argue that the economic hardship from sanctions decrease 
democracy levels because the targeted regimes use them as a tool to “consolidate authoritarian 
rule and weaken the opposition,” further impairing sanction’s ability to threaten their leadership. 
Consolidation of power and increased incentives to restrict political rights of opposition groups 
by the elite members of targeted countries harms civilians instead of intended targets (Peksen & 
Drury, 2010). Leaders frequently rationalize that receiving sanctions and surviving their 
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consequences at the expense of civilians is better than an alternative that threatens their position 
of power. In extreme cases, sanctions backfire by encouraging leaders to manipulate the media, 
become more repressive, and ultimately create more authoritarian regimes (Peksen, 2009; Wood, 
2008). 
Economic sanctions take several forms and justifications for their usage. For example, 
sanctions are employed as counterterrorism tools against sponsor states to eradicate the threat by 
targeting resources. In a study analyzing the imposition of sanctions to combat transnational 
terrorism, Bapat takes into account the skewed statistics on whether sanctions are in fact 
effective at reaching their goal, seeing that sanctions at the threat stage involve bargaining; when 
policy moves forward toward imposition, target states usually have already decided to not budge 
and take the economic damage (Bapat, 2016). National security policy tends to focus on state 
level analysis of security, but policymakers often fail to consider the full set of consequences that 
sanctions have on states’ populations and not just their governments. There is a lack of research 
on whether the types of sanctions make a significant effect terrorism levels, but more is focused 
on whether foreign counterterrorism efforts directly impact the targeted populations. Bapat et. 
al.’s study on the “incentive to misrepresent” concludes that some sponsor states act like host 
states in which governments do not take part in supporting the terrorist organizations on the 
international stage in order to avoid punishment; this creates uncertainty for those trying to 
combat transnational terrorism seeing that host states often do not have the capacity to eradicate 
the threat, and sanctioning them would only make matters worse (2015). Testing the dynamics of 
terrorist campaigns during sanctions, Mclean et al. (2018) concludes that sanctions can make 
terrorist campaigns survive or collapse based on the states’ relationship with the groups. 
Opposition groups tend to benefit from consequential political instability (Collier & Hoeffler, 
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2005; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Piazza, 2008). Distinguishing between terrorist sanctuaries and 
those states who fall victim to violent extremism should be considered before sanctions 
imposition to avoid such unintended consequences. Serving as an example that will be elaborated 
further in this study, Collins (2004) investigated political gains by economic means in the case of 
U.S. multilateral sanctions against Muammar Qaddafi’s regime, aiming at the sponsor state of 
Libya. Pressures from multilateral sanctions drastically reduced Libya’s state of sponsorship 
(Collins, 2004). Taking a deeper look at popular support for terrorist organizations, Bueno de 
Mesquita and Dickson (2007) see radicalization provoked from counterterror operations that 
backfire; they demonstrate that economic damage caused by counterterror activity or 
manipulation of counterterror efforts changes the population’s perspective of the enemy and 
increases popular support for extremist groups.  Other studies focus on coercive responses to 
terrorism in authoritarian versus democratic regimes; seeing that indiscriminate responses to 
terror is counterproductive for democracies, comprehensive sanctions tend to reduce the public’s 
cooperation with government authorities and cause an increase support for terrorist groups in 
target states (Daxecker & Hess, 2013). 
Choi and Luo’s (2013) cross-sectional study on the implications of sanctions and poverty 
on international terrorism show that sanctions intensify economic hardships on the poor within 
countries and thus increase grievance to the point that citizens are more likely to support or 
engage in international terrorism. Leaders take advantage of the enemy, skewing the blame of 
hardship and consequential inequality on the sender state. As a negative externality to policy 
decisions, international terrorism was shown to be positively associated with economic sanctions 
in findings from a cross-sectional data analysis of 152 countries, producing an environment with 
more incentives to rebel the consequential social injustices, where “the likelihood of 
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international terrorism increases by 93%,” according to the study (Choi & Luo, 2013). The 
argument is that sanctions cause an “external shock” that drives already struggling populations to 
living standards below level of basic survival, thus leading to an “aggrieved poor” rather than 
institutional poverty. Assessing civil conflict in wake of deteriorating economic conditions must 
account for several variables. However, in terms of economic shocks of sudden negative growth, 
chances of conflict from resulting inequality and sudden hopelessness tend to rise despite the 
levels of democracy and relative wealth (Miguel et al., 2004). Abrupt natural resource declines 
have demonstrated to cause exponential and irreversible damage to the dependent public 
(Gawande et al., 2017) while sanctions are argued to pose similar harm (Cortright, Millar, & 
Lopez, 2001; Weiss et al., 1997). Strung to the desire for revenge and retribution (anger, fear, 
hatred) coming from being underrepresented or treated with injustice from the State, terrorist 
organizations recruit from vulnerable populations. Besides citizens taking part in terrorist 
activity, Abbott (1987) analyzes levels of support for these groups taking the form of moral or 
verbal support instead of physical. States react by imposing sanctions to countries at the 
“sponsor” level, inciting groups to commit direct acts of terror and taking part in recruiting 
(Abbott, 1987). These sanctions often fail because there is no formal trade between non-state 
actors as there is between states (Ezrow, 2017). 
Sanctions intensify hardships and disperse them unevenly in targeted countries, 
functioning as external economic shocks. Leaders can then externalize blame from consequential 
economic grievances, manipulating the population to gather support and engage in violence 
against another actor depending on the regime type and power of the elite. Besides direct 
economic effects, whether unilateral or multilateral, targeted or traditional, sanctions also create 
political and social grievances that could mobilize actors to engage in terrorism. Literature 
 
 
8 
 
explains how terrorism stems from a mixture of factors such as regime type, rule of law, 
economic development, state failure, poverty, living conditions, ideology, war, and political 
instability, among others. A quick onset of deprivation stirs instability and psychological 
challenges that are exploited by the target country’s elite or extremist factions. The dynamics of 
terrorist campaigns largely depend on social phenomenon and interactions between them, the 
state, and society. The complexity of politically violent behavior stems from grievances that 
bring people together physically or ideologically, and the onset can be determined using distinct 
cases. The premise of this argument is that economic sanctions generate social injustices 
resulting from adversity such as recessionary economies and lack of opportunity; these 
deteriorating situations resulting from economic warfare fosters an atmosphere that make 
populations resort to terrorist activity as their only outlet. 
C. Individual Country Cases: 
Sanctions regimes against Bosnia and Herzegovina, Libya, and Iran are three cases facing 
different circumstances in terms of economic coercion depending on sanction type, diplomatic 
goals, sender states, and inflicted damage from these efforts. The following cases will outline 
these factors and provide literature about the effects and responses to sanctions during the time 
period in which they were sanctioned. 
Sanctions against Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-1995: 
The sanctions episode against Bosnia-Herzegovina was in response to atrocities from the 
Balkan war and the dismantling of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that was 
responsible for about 100,000 deaths recorded in what is also referred to as “the Bosnian Book of 
the Dead” (Tokaca, 1999). Bosnia and Herzegovina gained their independence on April 11, 1992 
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(GTD, 2018). Both the U.S. and Germany saw Serbian violence as the primary threat in the 
region, using coercive diplomatic tools to diminish the violence. The central government 
aggression between Serb and Croat national forces ended with the Dayton Accord, where the 
United states and European diplomats negotiated heavily on the fate of the territory using 
coercive economic policy as stepping stones in the process (Bose, 2002; Chandler, 2000; Keane, 
2002). Ethnic cleansing, mass killings, destruction of religious establishments, and camps 
signaled intervention of the international community which inducing implementation of United 
Nations sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 under Resolution 757 and 
787, with the objective to pressure the Yugoslav leader, Milosevic, to curtail support to the rebel 
Serbs in Bosnia, which would incite negotiation with Bosnian Serb leadership to end the war 
(S/RES/757; S/RES/787). These comprehensive sanctions were an extension of the targeted arms 
embargo in 1991 against the region to impede escalation of the violence, involving trade, and 
financial embargoes, as well as travel bans. UNSCR 942 tightened restrictions onto Bosnia-
Herzegovina specifically in the form of a total economic embargo and asset freezes, hitting the 
country the hardest (S/RES/942, 1994). The UN Security Council’s initial arms embargo was 
designed to hinder both opposition groups’ and the government’s ability to gain access to 
weapons. This effort to stop civilian deaths and ultimately improve conflict in the region 
involved pressuring negotiation onto all parties. However, the unintended consequences were 
broad and not distributed equally. The blockade unintentionally weakened the Bosnian Muslim 
(governmental) side because the Serbs and Croats had access to a plethora of outside 
relationships and supplies facilitated by neighbor countries taking part in “sanctions busting,” 
(Burg & Shoup, 1999). 
 
 
10 
 
Several case studies on the effect of sanctions against Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily 
by Peter Andreas, illustrate the evolvement of an extensive clandestine economy as citizens and 
opposition groups strategically maneuvered the blockade by forming organized criminal and 
trade networks through the black market with neighbor states, disproportionably dispersing arms 
to groups opposing the Bosnian government and prolonging violence. Several indicators show 
the decrease in livelihood based on dropping GDP severe drops in unemployment because of 
economic damage to the industrial production, and inflation (Yugoslav Federal Statistics Office, 
1998). State services disappeared hand in hand with lower levels of government legitimacy, 
health conditions deteriorated, and feelings of isolation resulted from lack of transport (Garfield, 
2001). Murders and suicide increased as the criminal sector took over most of civilian life, 
encompassing not only the smuggle economy, but also what Andreas (2005) describes as 
“thugs,” that reshaped the culture and provided an environment that gave few options for 
survival. Humanitarian impacts according to UNICEF include intellectual and cultural isolation, 
as well as internal control by the government on access to humanitarian goods and medicines 
although these items were exempt from the sanctions (Garfield, 2001). This exacerbated the 
suffering of vulnerable groups such as those depending solely on the private sector, the poor, and 
those without political connections. Survival largely depended on relationships outside of the 
regime and country, the black market, and in part on humanitarian aid (Andreas, 2004). This 
fostering of relationships between the population and criminal networks led to a study by 
Mincheva and Gurr (2010) about terrorist movements and criminal networks, which have been 
previously analyzed separately because of their objectives. They argue that terrorist 
organizations are driven by everyday crime in order to attain necessary resources. Without 
robbery, smuggling, drug trafficking, and human dependence for financing, these organizations 
 
 
11 
 
would likely not survive, and therefore they rely heavily on criminal networks whether they be 
created themselves or coordinated with established criminals. The relationship goes both ways, 
where the drive for profit or material gain takes advantage of militant movements, creating a 
business linkage or at least making more complex intertwining of the two actors. The arms 
embargo put the Serbs in a superior position to the Bosnian Muslims who sought survival 
through ties to the Islamic world, which, according to Mincheva and Gurr, was the beginning of 
criminal/terrorist ties (p. 194). Radical Islamic fighters, or the “mujahideen,” made up of several 
nationalities in the Middle East and Africa and members of terrorist organizations, fled to Bosnia 
starting in 1992 in effort to fight in the name of Islam. The lasting effects of the established 
criminal and jihadist network impacted Bosnian society socially, economically, and politically, 
while the international community also felt the implications a concentrated terrorist territory. 
(Andreas, 2004; Corpora, 2004; Mincheva & Gurr, 2010). 
Interests of different parties during the Bosnian war complicate the situation in which 
foreign ties facilitate cultural integration. Innes (2005) studies terrorism sanctuaries created in 
Bosnia during the war, alluding to sanctions-busting allowing for a more criminalized network, 
as Andreas had, and creation of foreign relationships. However, he mentions that sanctuaries 
within another country means foreign terrorism is the focus, but it is a lot more complex as the 
interests of Bosnians are different and focused on the state. The war brewed an extensive 
increase in foreign and domestic terrorism as well as support from different parties toward 
different factions. The line between foreign and domestic terrorists has more to do with the 
relationship these people have with the state and what their stakes are in the war. The influx of 
international sanctuaries in the territory makes a need for distinguishing circumstances that made 
indigenous civilians turn to violent measures for political gains; the foreign and domestic 
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interests soon overlapped as parts of the population began to radicalize. An excerpt from Innes’ 
Terrorist Sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Challenging Conventional Assumptions (2005) 
encompasses the factors worsened by economic sanctions alongside the war: 
“Substate administrative structures, local communities and institutions, deficient border 
and document controls, and essentially unmonitored tracts of difficult terrain, have 
virtually guaranteed access to the kinds of resources that facilitate domestic and 
international terrorists: funds, false papers, weapons, communications, community-based 
support, refuge from police and judicial interference, and transshipment capabilities and 
opportunities.” 
Giving insight on how these kinds of terrorist groups manipulate other actors, Peterson explains 
how emotions are used strategically to shape preferences, actors, and strategies for terror. Using 
violence to provoke government responses, terrorists mobilize populations into radicalization 
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2007). The actors in this case are the aggrieved population who make the 
decision to radicalize or not to; terrorism is thus strongly based on emotion trying to invoke 
responses to their violent behavior under the influence of anger and drive to blame and punish 
enemies (Peterson, p. 89). The adverse consequences of sanctions in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina allowed for these jihadist groups to strategically emphasize a struggle against the 
government using these types of tools. As the Bosnian President played a role in recruiting 
foreign fighters against the Serbs, the mujahideen made a successful effort to recruit 
domestically and sought citizenship in the country after the Dayton Peace accords of 1995 
(Mustapha, 2013). While the war gave reason for extremists to fight for Islam alongside the 
Bosnian government, sanctions were the catalysts to the extensive clandestine economy and a 
new network of foreign relationships that facilitated the smuggling of arms and human resources. 
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Cooperation between the foreign jihadist fighters and the local citizens grew, and parts of the 
local population radicalized alongside the extremist movement. 
The statistical procedure keeps in mind these factors, where the number of attacks is the 
dependent variable in this study. GDP, war, …. Account for omitted variable bias in the 
regression 
UN Sanctions against Libya 1992-2003: 
Economic sanctions employed as counterterrorism policy in the absence of force became 
popular in the 1990’s. Targeted sanctions that are intended to ease detrimental unintended 
consequences on the civilian population became an alternative to comprehensive sanctions after 
the those on Iraq in 1990 yielded severe humanitarian costs (Weiss et al., 1997). Beginning in 
1991, U.S. blacklisted numerous Libyan businesses in effort to inhibit Libya’s involvement in 
the international economy in response to suspected support in the destruction of the Lockerbie 
Pan American flight 103 and Union de Transports Aeriens flight 772 in 1991. Support sought by 
the U.S., Britain, and France from the UN elicited Resolution 731 and 748 in 1992 that 
encompassed the following: arms embargo, air embargo, decreased diplomatic representation, 
and expulsion and denial of entry to suspected Libyans (SC/RES/731, 1992; SC/RES/748, 1992). 
Resolution 883 tightened sanctions due to noncompliance, further applying financial asset 
freezes on the government and a ban on oil equipment. The premise of these targeted sanctions 
was to seek justice for the terrorist attacks over Lockerbie and end the regime’s support for 
international terrorism (S/RES/883, 1992). This case is often referred to as a success of targeted 
sanction strategy, where the sanctions were a central factor to negotiations that eventually 
brought the suspects to trial and eliminated Qaddafi’s encouragement and potential sponsorship 
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of terrorist activity in 2003 when the UN sanctions were formally lifted (Cortright & Lopez, 
2005; Hufbauer et al., 2009). 
The effectiveness of these sanctions episodes was largely due to the hardships that came 
with the scope of economic pressure as well as other contributing factors that already existed. 
Besides immediate economic effects, the sanctions signaled to the international community the 
condemnation of their behavior, making it more difficult to keep an undamaged reputation. 
While intentionally designed to be targeted, the sanctions hit the general population with rising 
inflation, unemployment, and decreased living standards that was already widespread with 
economic mismanagement (Niblock, 2001; O’Sullivan, 2003). The energy, commercial, 
industrial, transportation and communications, and agricultural sectors suffered the most 
economically in part because of Qaddafi’s recent efforts toward liberalization (Anderson, 1999; 
Niblock, 2001, p. 63). Higher prices for imported goods from both from sanctions and transport 
limitations made the underground economy more potent, delegitimizing the government as it was 
already relying on private businesses; the regime had less control over prices and distributing 
simple commodities. Because of the failing businesses, people were much more dependent on 
the limited state support and rations available. Socially, corruption became widespread, isolation 
emerged in groups, and the creation of an elite class emphasized the huge wealth gap few that 
were able to take advantage of the state’s economic instability (Niblock, 2001). Politically, 
perhaps most interestingly, a “rally around the flag effect” developed as Qaddafi garnered 
support from the population by emphasizing an external threat, strategically strengthening his 
position of power (p. 89). Thus, the regime created a role for the traditional leaders to manage 
the population politically. 
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Collins evaluates strategies of dissuading state support of terrorism, using Libya as a case 
exemplifying the impacts of several tools: military force, unilateral sanctions, and multilateral 
sanctions as those described that were passed by the U.N. Qaddafi’s practice of state-supported 
terrorism became non-existent after imposition of sanctions in 1992; this suggests that the 
effectiveness of this case is due to the “heightened scrutiny within the international community,” 
and thus the interests at stake of the power 5 states of the UN security council led to widespread 
cooperation. The difference between this sanctions episode from other counterterrorist efforts is 
the consistency and perseverance together with compliance from international actors, even Arab 
states (Collins, 2004). Conversely, Drezner and Niblcok (2011) argue that the government had 
given up the terrorist support years before, and that other factors contributed to the change in 
terrorist activity, one of which being Muhammar Qaddafi’s idealistic qualities (Jentleson & 
Whytock, 2005). This stresses the need for extensive analysis of different types of sanctions 
policies and their effects on terrorism, including the reasons that sanctions are imposed in the 
first place. Additionally, the notion of regime type plays a large role in this sanctions case. 
Literature suggests that authoritarian regimes are less vulnerable to coercion than democracies 
(Solomon, 2012). The UN was able to squeeze concessions out of Qaddafi, given his tendencies 
and personality. 
For the purposes of this study, the case of Libya suggests further research on sanction’s 
effects on the proliferation of terrorism given the type of sanctions imposed and the nature of the 
regime’s leader. The data is limited to the number of terrorist attacks sponsored by Libya’s 
government and those taking place within the country. It would worth analyzing data about the 
number of people who radicalize or join terrorist groups in such instances. 
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Sanctions regime against Iran 2010-2015 
 
The United States and Iran historically have undergone international disputes since the 
1970’s when President Jimmy Carter mounted the first U.S. sanctions against Iran. Since then, 
several sanctions episodes and diplomatic tensions have persisted over the decades under 
different United States presidents, for different justifications and with varying levels of 
intensification and relief. Sanctions against Iran date back to 1979 in response to the hostage 
crisis, where a group of Iranian students took 60 Americans from the U.S. embassy in Iran, due 
in part by rising anti-American sentiment. Hostilities from long-standing presence of sanctions 
since President Carter’s administration may have conditioned Iran to tolerate and evade sanctions 
over the decades, adapting strategies that helped the country mitigate suffering from the costs. 
The United States’ energy-related sanctions on Iran began its aggressive course in 1996 with the 
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2013). As sanctions had 
largely been unilateral, the scope of stringency against Iran’s nuclear activity made Iran face 
additional pressure from international institutions in recent decades. 
This case focuses on United States-led international sanctions regime beginning in 2010 
until the Iran Nuclear Deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was negotiated in 2015 
by Iran and the P5+1 states. EU and UN sanctions began in 2006, but the cooperation of the 
global community to tighten its pressure toward nonproliferation strengthened during the 2010-
2015, extending its influence on foreign actors. 
 
United States Sanctions: 
Upon passing the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act in 
2010, the United States’ goal to isolate Iran from the international financial system began its 
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strongest effort that included extra-territorial sanctions provisions to punish foreign entities that 
were involved in undercutting sanctions efforts. CISADA worked to amend and tighten the Iran 
Sanctions Act of 1996. Specifically, this round of sanctions targeted firms investing in Iran’s 
energy sector or gasoline industry, as well as banks involved in certain Iranian business ventures 
connected to Weapons of Mass Destruction or terrorism. To be more effective in addressing 
Iran’s nuclear development and support for international terrorism, diplomatic efforts to crack 
down on Iran’s government was in the U.S. government’s national interest especially after 
suspected emergence of atomic energy facilities and transport of dual-use technologies 
(H.R.2194, 2010). In 2011, President Obama signed the national Defense Authorization Act 
imposing new sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and threatening third party countries’ access 
to the U.S. financial system that undergo significant financial transactions with Iran, specifically 
importation of oil (U.S. Department of State). President Obama’s administration further made an 
effort to reduce oil revenue address human rights abuses and money laundering through 
CISADA and related executive orders and laws such as E.O. 13553 and the Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation 
Act of 2012 (Belfer Center, 2015; Laub, 2015; U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
 
United Nations Sanctions: 
2006 marked the first set of sanctions consisting of an embargo on dual-use materials 
used in uranium production and banned any nuclear-related financial assistance, freezing assets 
of individuals and companies. Resolution 1929 signed in 2010 joined the United States in 
targeting Iran’s financial sector and oil industry to promote nonproliferation. Secondary 
sanctions expanded to parties doing business with Iran, prohibiting nearly all involvement with 
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its financial and energy sectors. Reaffirming the provisions of previous resolutions, Res. 1929 
recognizes “the potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and 
the funding of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities,” serving as the basis to stringent 
amendments that complement the United States’ goals and the European Union (SC/RES/1929, 
2010). 
 
European Union Sanctions: 
After freezing individuals’ and companies’ assets involved in Iran’s nuclear program in 
2007 (Reg 423, 2007), the EU simultaneously strengthened its sanctions in 2010 along with the 
UN and U.S. Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP adopted measures outline in Resolution 1929 
while also widening the scope of restriction from previous sanctions. To reiterate, this includes 
banned export to Iran of all arms and material, prohibited financial assistance to the nuclear 
activities, banned export of dual-use items and technologies, and provided a running blacklist of 
sanctioned people and companies. This added to the international effort by blocking European 
countries from doing business with Iran and its banks. The oil embargo instilled in 2012 
magnified the damage on Iran’s economy, when the EU was previously the largest importer of 
Iran’s oil (Congressional Research Service). 
 
Impacts of International Sanctions on Iran: 
According to the Congressional Research Service, sanctions have had extremely 
detrimental effects on Iran’s economy while having little success of coercion and change in 
behavior. The financial and energy sanctions affect the whole Iranian economy because of its 
dependence on oil revenue, trickling into the general population. Iran’s GDP shrank by 9% 
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during the sanction’s regime, and crude oil exports reduced from 2.5 million barrels per day to 
1.1 million (Katzman, 2018). The unemployment rate rose to 20% until JCPOA negotiations in 
2015, and the currency declined remarkably with subsequent inflation rates reaching 40% 
(United States Institute of Peace, 2015). Inequality skyrocketed in areas of education, health, 
food, and income, leaving seven million people living in poverty, detailed by the Minister of 
Labor Ali Rabiei (2014). Ordinary citizens struggled to obtain basic goods and services to 
survive alongside worsening humanitarian conditions (Heydarian, 2012). 
In a study by Reza Farzanegan (2013), sanctions prompted increased corruption, rent-
seeking, and a large extension to the black market creating several social and political 
implications similar to Mincheva and Gurr’s theory of political and criminal linkages discussed 
in the case of Bosnia. The rising informal economy and its potential impact of fostering foreign 
relationships suggests coping mechanisms beyond simply economic relief, but also socially and 
culturally; those suffering from isolation may see the black market as a passage to an otherwise 
restricted global network. A compelling finding by Farzanegan suggests the informal economy 
could actually improve political stability by reducing income inequality (2013). The notion of 
elite manipulation and scapegoating can be exemplified rather concretely in this case, as well. 
Iranian leaders used external pressures to redirect blame to the United States and Britain over 
financial sanctions and trying to delegitimize reporting mechanisms (Choi & Luo, 2013; Schott, 
2012). Using the poor and aggrieved in particular, Iranian leaders could take advantage of 
powerless civilians to retain their reputation by “othering” the aggressors. Choi and Luo (2013) 
reason the danger in this, where quickly deteriorating economic conditions and living standards 
could motivate populations to act violently against the perceived culprits. 
 
 
20 
 
Additionally, international sanctions created severe repercussions in the health industry 
over the past decade during the international sanctions period. Several studies have focused on 
individual diseases and lack of access to needed medicine. Although medicine was not formally 
sanctioned, they resulted in major difficulties of importing pharmaceutical drugs and ingredients 
to make them as well as the equipment needed to sustain adequate healthcare (Cheraghali, 2013; 
Gorgi, 2014; Hashemi-Meshkni, 2014). 
Unintended consequences from international sanctions have produced economic decline, 
social and financial isolation, inadequate and unequal healthcare, social inequality from the 
soaring wealth gap, and elite manipulation despite the ineffectiveness of their goals. There is 
little evidence that shows significant slowing of Iran’s nuclear program despite the international 
sanctions of 2010-2015; U.S. intelligence even suspects just the opposite: that the nuclear and 
missile program has expanded in “scale, reach, and sophistication” (Katzman, 2014). Factors that 
allude to the possibility of terrorism proliferation emerged in wake of international sanctions 
creating an economic shock that changed much of the Iranian environment in a very short 
amount of time. 
Methods 
The purpose of this study is to assess how the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool 
produces favorable conditions for an increase in terrorism activity using the proposed cases. The 
three countries differ in time period, type of sanctions imposed, preexisting political, social, and 
economic conditions, as well as the quantitative damage felt by the sanctions. 
A. Variables and data 
The dependent variable, terrorist activity, is a numeric measure that accounts for all 
terrorist attacks, international or domestic, defined by the Global Terrorism Database as “the 
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threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (2018). To be coded 
as an incident, it must be intentional, entail some level of violence, and the perpetrators must be 
sub-national actors. As the armed conflict variable is included in this study, GTD does not 
include actions in the context of legitimate war activities. The data for this variable employs 
LaFree and Dugan’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (2017) that encompasses years from 
1968 and stops in 2017. Economic sanctions is the focus of the independent variables, coded by 
‘0’ in the absence of sanctions, and ‘1’ in the presence of sanctions, regardless of the sender 
states and type of sanction. This does not include threatened sanctions. These cases are derived 
from United Nations Sanctions lists and Resolutions, the United States Department of State 
archives, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury. 
The included control variables have been considered as factors contributing to terrorism 
as described in the literature review portion of this study: GDP per capita, unemployment, 
democracy, economic development, population growth, and armed conflict, and are used to 
reduce omitted variable bias. Other control factors that should be considered are absent because 
of lack of data that goes until the end of the Iran sanctions case. 
GDP, unemployment, economic development, and national income are used to show the 
level of economic shock that the country faces during the imposition of sanctions, as well as 
indicators of inequality. Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2009) and the World Bank (2018) 
datasets are used to derive Real Gross Domestic Product per capita in U.S. current dollar amount 
and purchasing power parity (PPP) over GDP. National Income is derived from the World 
Inequality Database (Atkinson & Piketty, 2017). Both national income and PPP are used as a 
substitute for the GINI coefficient that would otherwise represent inequality in the countries but 
 
 
22 
 
is limited in data for the countries in this study. Theories of quickly onset inequality are based on 
domestic inequality versus the state compared internationally; these are the variables that 
represent such conditions within borders. The economic development variable uses these 
numbers to represent economic opportunity. 
Annual population growth percentage variable may suggest inability for the government 
to provide security for a rapidly growing number of citizens.  Eyerman (1998) and Savun and 
Phillips (2009) theorize that highly populated countries and those left without jobs are more 
difficult to police, making terrorist activity more likely. These numbers are from the U.S. Census 
Bureau (2017). Unemployment rate and inflation are used in conjunction with the economic 
development indicators to account for poverty levels, taken from the World Bank (2018). 
Marshal, Monty, and Jaggers’ updated Polity IV project (2017) codes countries’ 
democracy levels, from full democracy (10) to full autocracy (-10) that is used for the democracy 
variable. This polity score uses qualities of executive recruitment, constraints of political 
competition and executive authority, as well as changes in the institution (Marshal et al., 2017). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, was in a period of central authority interruption, collapse, 
or transition during the sanctions period at the beginning of its independence, therefore the 
democracy variable is coded as ‘0’. 
War is likely to increase levels of terrorism for much of the same reasons that sanctions 
are, causing similar hardships but adds dimensions of violence and death. Violent attacks that are 
acts of war are not considered as terrorist events that are perpetrated by non-state actors; the 
presence of interstate and intrastate armed conflict is accounted for by using UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson, Therese, & Eck, 2018). 
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Variables in this study’s dataset amount to: GDP per capita, sanctions imposition (0 or 1), 
unemployment rate, democracy score, inflation, annual population growth, armed conflict (0 or 
1), gdp adjusted for ppp, national income, and terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks are coded in 
order to account for high numbers in heavily active years as (0) for those without any activity, 
(1) for attacks between 1 and 5, 2 for attacks between 6 and 10, (3) for attacks between 11 and 
20, and (4) for those years having more than 20 attacks. Some missing data occurs with gdp 
adjusted for purchasing power parity and is therefore omitted as a variable in the Iran case. 
Inflation rate data is absent in the years analyzed for Bosnia-Herzogovina because of the 
institutional transition, where it is omitted as a control variable in the dataset for the country. 
Results and Analysis 
A. Data Summary 
Running a multiple regression test against the terrcode (terrorist code) variable, 4 models 
show the statistical significance of each variable along with the variance, where the dataset 
encompasses a 10-15-year period depending on the available data before, during, and after 
sanctions imposition years. Model1 describes results combining the three cases together, 
omitting inflation because of Bosnia’s lack of data collection for that variable. Model2 
encompasses the same regression for Iran from 1990 until 2017, keeping in mind that they were 
under unilateral sanctions before the recent multilateral sanctions episode that this focuses on. 
Flaws in the GDP adjusted for PPP data collection after 2005 omits the variable from this test. 
Model3 represents the regression for Libya from 1990-2010, where Stata15 omitted armed 
conflict and democracy score for collinearity. Model4 does the same for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
starting when the country gained independence in 1991 until 2002, where the software 
automatically omits sanctions and democracy score because of collinearity. 
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The following Table compiles the coefficient results where the number in parenthesis 
describes the p-value: 
Variable Model1 Model2(Iran) Model3(Libya) Model4(BH) 
National 
Income 
-0.00007 
(.001) .00001(.949) .00000(.975) 0.00056(.820) 
 
GDP adjusted 
PPP -.00003(.590) -- -.00005(.875) -.00307(.471) 
 
Armed 
Conflict .29701(.392) .31579(.621) -- 1.5272(.722) 
 
Annual 
Population 
Growth .09755(.324) .57742(.541) -1.04151(.095) 0.12478(.893) 
 
Inflation -- .00998(.731) .04378(.516) -- 
 
Democracy 
Score -.08725(.121) -.73014(.265) -- -- 
 
Unemployment 
Rate -.04773(.156) -.03827(.845) .58290(.349) -.26785(.807) 
Sanctions 
Imposition -.00996(.978) .13441(.894) .51116(.452) -- 
 
GDP Per 
Capita .00012(.173) .00008(.709) .00008(.578) 0.00249(.321) 
 
Constant 3.16167(.000) .10018(.988) -8.98015(.515) 5.05876(.815) 
R² 0.429 0.1228 0.297 0.48 
(regressions against terrorcode instead of terrorist attacks because of possible 
outliers in heavily active years) 
 
The models consistently result show no results of statistical significance amongst the 
independent variables and the dependent variable (terrcode). Overall, the combined data 
considering all the variables showed Prob > F = .015 proving to be statistically significant at a 
95% confidence level, rejecting the null hypothesis that in other words, all of the coefficients on 
the independent variables are equal to zero. However, none of the variables except for national 
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income and the constant show a p-value less than .05. Only 42.9% of the variance is explained 
by the compiled data. 
Because of potential flaws in this model and presence of confounding variables, a 
regression test between sanctions and economic development variables was conducted: 
 
Showing statistical significance at the 95% level, the whole model correlates with 
changes in the independent variable (sanctions imposition). Adjusted R² suggests that the model 
only explains around 20% of variability in the dependent variable. Most of these results suggest 
that sanctions account for changes in economic conditions, where unemployment rate and GDP 
adjusted for purchasing power parity per capita rise with a change from no sanctions imposition 
to sanctions imposition. Additional observations would make for better analysis. This test was 
run to then analyze sanctions imposition with cross tabulation tools across the different cases. 
This tool refers to a more specified analysis of occurrences of terrorism and sanctions imposition 
as categorical variables: 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.3104738   .2146814    -1.45   0.154    -.7405324    .1195847
      NatInc     -.000015   7.25e-06    -2.07   0.043    -.0000295   -4.95e-07
   GDPadjPPP     .0000849   .0000213     3.98   0.000     .0000421    .0001276
    UnempRat     .0318354   .0112463     2.83   0.006     .0093063    .0543645
   GDPPerCap    -.0000852   .0000349    -2.44   0.018    -.0001551   -.0000152
                                                                              
       Sanct        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    14.0655738        60   .23442623   Root MSE        =    .43126
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2066
    Residual    10.4149972        56  .185982093   R-squared       =    0.2595
       Model    3.65057655         4  .912644137   Prob > F        =    0.0018
                                                   F(4, 56)        =      4.91
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        61
. regress Sanct GDPPerCap UnempRat GDPadjPPP NatInc
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Throughout the 61 years examined, terrorist attack activity within the countries occurred 
27 times in years during the absence of sanctions, and 12 years during 22 sanctioned years. The 
years with the most terrorist attacks (20+), occurred 3 out of 4 times during years that sanctions 
were not imposed. 
Iran: 
Iran’s data proved to be insignificant against the dependent variable (terrcode) overall, 
and likewise with all the independent variables. To single out sanctions on their own, a cross 
tabulation table describes occurrences between the two categorical variables, sanctions 
imposition and terror code from a year to year basis: 
 
Years where sanctions were not imposed, there were attacks in 13 out of the 22 years examined. 
Only 4 years had no terrorist attacks at all, and one year where there were more than 20 attacks. 
Attacks occurred in all the years that multilateral sanctions were imposed on Iran, however. 
          Pearson chi2(4) =   1.4625   Pr = 0.833
     Total          22         14         12          9          4          61 
                                                                              
         1          10          4          4          3          1          22 
         0          12         10          8          6          3          39 
                                                                              
     Sanct           0          1          2          3          4       Total
                                    TerrCode
. tabulate sanct terrcode, chi2
          Pearson chi2(4) =   2.2626   Pr = 0.688
     Total           4          6          8          9          1          28 
                                                                              
         1           0          1          2          3          0           6 
         0           4          5          6          6          1          22 
                                                                              
     Sanct           0          1          2          3          4       Total
                                    TerrCode
. tabulate sanct terrcode, chi2
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Libya: 
From the regression, Libya had no signs of statistical significance from any part of the test. A 
cross tabulation table organizes sanctions imposition and yearly terrorist activity in Libya: 
 
No more than 5 terrorist attacks were conducted over a single year during the observation period. 
2 years with terrorist activity occurred over the 9 years without sanctions, and 3 years out of 12 
in during the sanctioned period. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Many flaws are present in the regression test for Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially with 
multiple omitted variables. Therefore, a table comparing occurrences shows a better picture of 
the focused independent variable against terrorist attack activity: 
 
Out of the 8 years absent of sanctions, there were 7 years with terrorist activity, 2 of 
which had more than 20 attacks. During the 4 years of sanctions, which was also during the 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0219   Pr = 0.882
     Total          16          5          21 
                                             
         1           9          3          12 
         0           7          2           9 
                                             
     Sanct           0          1       Total
                   TerrCode
. tabulate sanct terrcode, chi2
          Pearson chi2(3) =   2.2500   Pr = 0.522
     Total           2          3          4          3          12 
                                                                   
         1           1          0          2          1           4 
         0           1          3          2          2           8 
                                                                   
     Sanct           0          1          2          4       Total
                              TerrCode
. tabulate sanct terrcode, chi2
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Bosnian war, there were attacks in 3 of them. Out of those, there were more than 10 attacks in 
each year. 
Armed Conflict and Sanctions Cross-Tabulation tests: 
The following tables organize the data amongst the three categorical variables: armed conflict, 
sanctions imposition, and terrorist activity on a yearly basis using the three countries together 
displayed by percentage: 
 
These numbers suggest that armed conflict and sanctions together may affect the 
instability within a country, more than when both variables occur separately. Still, however, 
armed conflict seems to aggravate terrorist activity more than sanctions are. 
                                                                               
          Pearson chi2(4) =   9.0597   Pr = 0.060
     Total       45.45      18.18      18.18      13.64       4.55      100.00 
                                                                              
         1       16.67       0.00      33.33      33.33      16.67      100.00 
         0       56.25      25.00      12.50       6.25       0.00      100.00 
                                                                              
    ArmCon           0          1          2          3          4       Total
                                    TerrCode
-> sanct = 1
                                                                               
          Pearson chi2(4) =  10.3183   Pr = 0.035
     Total       30.77      25.64      20.51      15.38       7.69      100.00 
                                                                              
         1       14.29      21.43      28.57      35.71       0.00      100.00 
         0       40.00      28.00      16.00       4.00      12.00      100.00 
                                                                              
    ArmCon           0          1          2          3          4       Total
                                    TerrCode
-> sanct = 0
                                                                               
. by sanct, sort: tabulate armcon terrcode, row nofreq chi2
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B. Discussion 
The data fails to reveal a convincing argument that sanctions imposed on the cases of 
Iran, Libya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, lead to higher occurrences of terror attacks as opposed to 
years that the target states are not subject to sanctions. Additional observations would make for 
better analysis in each case, however there are many more variables and circumstances present 
throughout the history of these countries that could affect the dependent variable. Datasets for 
other variables such as human rights abuses, the Gini coefficient, and underground economy 
indicators are inconsistent, have missing values for the years that this study is interested in, or 
stop before 2010. The GTD database itself stopped collecting data after 2018, where a similar 
study analyzing United States’ withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal would seek other sources 
of terror attack data. The economic development variables in this research study mostly depend 
on the presence of sanctions but are used separately to see whether they make a difference in 
each case’s situation. Finding variables to illustrate inequality within a country was difficult 
because the most direct indicators that could have been used are missing data for one of the 
countries or has missing years. Collectively, national income is the only variable that has a 
significant effect on terrorist activity. 
Conclusion and Implications 
Literature suggests that situations in Iran and Bosnia-Herzogovina’s during sanctions imposition 
created circumstances for rising terrorist activity, while Libya had a more targeted sanctions 
strategy where the authoritarian leader had incentives to concede to pressure. The statistical data 
in this study goes against the hypothesis that sanctions as a foreign policy tool creates favorable 
conditions for increase in terrorism activity using cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Libya, and Iran. 
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The situations in each country were completely different, where the effects of sanctions may be 
closely associated with either war, adaptation to a history of sanctions, the type and personality 
of the regime’s leader, or sanctions type. Attributing rising terrorist activity to sanctions 
themselves ignores the complexity of foreign economies their political and social atmospheres in 
which they operate. With more advanced statistical capability, there are ways to test these 
variables more closely to paint a better picture of sanctions’ effects of terrorism. Further research 
should focus on the type of sanctions imposed, reasons for sanctions imposition and whether 
they are focused on counterterrorism, whether targeted states are hosts or sponsors of terrorism, 
and the ideological background of citizens. Libya’s sanctions were initially shaped as 
counterterrorism tools and is considered to be one of the few targeted sanctions successes. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was going through war and an institutional transition period that prompted 
sanctions. Iran has dealt with diplomatic hostility since the late 1970’s that may have given the 
government and society the ability to live with the effects that were magnified during multilateral 
sanctions efforts. 
The situations in each country were completely different, where the effects of sanctions 
may be closely associated with either war, adaptation to a history of sanctions, the type and 
personality of the regime’s leader, or sanctions type. Attributing rising terrorist activity to 
sanctions themselves ignores the complexity of foreign economies their political and social 
atmospheres in which they operate. With more advanced statistical capability, there are ways to 
test these variables more closely to paint a better picture of sanctions’ effects of terrorism. 
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